SOMALIA

On 2 December 1960, a new state will come into being, Somalia, the "Land of Spices," is the second nation to be created by fiat of the United Nations. (Libya was the first.) During the past nine years, Italy, as the Administering Authority, has been struggling to create a viable state out of this sand-ridden country, largely populated by nomads. The skeleton framework of government and of a bureaucratic elite has been created, an educational system initiated for the less mobile elements of the population, and a sense of nationhood aroused among politically conscious Somalis.

Sovereignty, however, will be but another step in a long, hard road, with few economic resources to hold out a promise of future prosperity. The United Nations, which took a series of unprecedented steps in an effort to protect its ward during the period of tutelage—by elaborating the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, appending a bill of rights, and providing an Advisory Council to work with Italy—may find itself with even graver responsibilities for Somalia in the years ahead.

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Editor-in-Chief

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Somali Environment and Heritage

AT THE END OF 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations resolved that Somalia would become independent by 2 December 1960. For the first time in the history of the United Nations a target date was imposed on a Trusteeship Power. The decision departed from the Western principle of gradualism, a principle which assumes that full independence can be stable and secure only if the political bases of a state derive from prolonged tutelage, from constitutional maturity, and from basic popular consensus on the essentials of state unity and aims. It also ignored the Western tendency to assume that economic viability is a prerequisite to political stability. But in defense of the Assembly's decision, it can be said today that Africa has been in no mood to wait. The assumptions of "sound," "responsible," and "mature" self-government developed by the West have become irrelevant. Africans want change, and they want it quickly. Even the timetable concept is fast going out of fashion.

The Land and Its People

The territory which by virtue of the Assembly's resolution became a special concern of the United Nations embraces an area of approximately 500,000 square kilometers of low, semi-desert land with an estimated population of 1,250,000. Seventy per cent of the population are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists who move about within traditional grazing grounds, covering large expanses of territory in search of pasturage and water for their livestock. The remaining thirty per cent are engaged primarily in agriculture, mixed farming, and to a more limited extent in government,

small industries, and commerce. Another estimated 1,250,000 Somalis live in the contiguous regions of British Somaliland, the Northern Province of Kenya, the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, and in French Somaliland—forming one of the largest, if not the largest, homogeneous groups in sub-Sahara Africa. Although split politically as a result of the partitioning of Africa in the nineteenth century, the Somalis remain homogeneous with respect to language, religion, and racial characteristics. They consider themselves descendants of the tribe of the Prophet Mohammed and by and large follow the "noble" occupation of livestock herding.

Although largely semi-arid, Somalia has some soil which permits dry-land farming and relatively good pasturage if and when the rains fall during the two annual rainy seasons. The two rivers in the south, the Uebi Scebeli and the Giuba, permit some intensive agriculture. No exploitable mineral resources have yet been discovered. In sum, the economy of Somalia is one of the least diversified and one of the poorest in Africa.

Historically, the Somali social system has been characterized by division and endemic inter-group conflict. The main division is between the Samaale and the Sab segments. The former, comprised of the Darod, Hawiye, and Dir clan families, who occupy the regions north of the Uebi Scebeli and south of the Giuba, are principally nomads and semi-nomads. The Sab, consisting of the Rahanwein and Dighil clan families, are predominately cultivators who live in the area between the two rivers. The Samaale are closely grouped genealogically and consider the Sab, who intermarried with the Negroid people they conquered, to be less pure racially and of more lowly origin. Perhaps more important, the Sab engage in the "menial" occupation of farming. The progressive elements of both groups now regard themselves and each other as members of the Somali nation, but among traditionalists the distinction often has important social and political repercussions.

SOURCES FOR MAP: United Nations Doc. A/3754/Add.1, 3 Dec. 1957, Map. No. 1, and I. M. Lewis, *Peoples of the Horn of Africa, op. cit.* in Footnote 1.


LEGEND
Ethiopian interpretation of 1908 convention
Italian interpretation of 1908 convention
Provisional administrative line (1950)
Somali ethnic limits (approx.)
Haud and reserved area
GULF OF ADEN
FRENCH SOMALILAND
Djibouti
Bosaso
BRITISH SOMALILAND
Jijiga
Hargeisa
ETHIOPIA
Wal Wal
OGADEN
Uebe Scebeli R.
Galcaio
SOMALIA
Obbia
Fer Fer
Dolo
Bulo Burti
Baidoa
KENYA
Giuba R.
Mogadiscio
INDIAN OCEAN
Chisimaio
Tana R.
SOMALIA

Whether Somalis are educated government officials, entrepreneurs, or agriculturalists, their thinking is deeply affected by the heritage of nomadism. The nomad has thought for centuries in terms of the interests and needs of his *rer,* a group of families united by kinship. He has his own principles of association, law, justice, and government, and has clung to them. His loyalty is to his *rer,* as the smallest social unit, and to the clan family as the largest. Beyond these he owes no civic obligation or duties. The political action of his group is determined not by some impersonal and remote political leader but by the majority opinion of tribal members whom he knows intimately. In the traditional system there is no highly developed bureaucracy and no hierarchy of officials. Such a society, with its members constantly on the move, does not lend itself easily to the highly formalized traditions of authority and government as we understand them.[1]

Islam has made a valuable contribution to the Somali social order and, although pre-Islamic customs persist, the *Shari'a,* the body of Islamic law, is widely accepted.[2] Religious leaders have always taken the lead in preaching the need for unity and "brotherhood." But although they have helped to foster a Somali consciousness molded around Islamic ideology, they have failed to dissolve the discord that has characterized Somali society. The elimination of these divisive forces, or rather their diminution, had to await the arrival of other purveyors of change: European administrators, World War II, the United Nations, and a Somali generation dedicated to a new ideology—nationalism.

Italian Colonial Administration

A considerable literature has developed on the "benefits" or "brutality" of Fascist imperialism in Africa. Italy began

[1] See I. M. Lewis, *Peoples of the Horn of Africa—Somali, Afar and Saho* (London, International African Institute, 1955), and Enrico Cerulli, *Somalia, Scritti vari Editi ed inediti* (Rome, Istituto polografico dello Stato, 1957). Also, N. Puccioni, *Antropologia ed Etnografia delle Genti della Somalia,* 3 vols. (Bologna, 1931-36).

[2] See V. Mellana, *Diritto processuale islamico somalo* (Mogadiscio, Tip. Missione, 1957).

acquiring control over the coastal Somali region in 1889, but it was not until 1905 that the state took direct measures to administer the territory. As far as Somalia was concerned, there was little distinction between the colonial administration established then and the Fascist administration that succeeded it in 1923—the main difference being that Fascism made a greater effort to alter Somali society.

The Fascists wanted change. They wanted change for the sake of their Autarkic State, for the eventual conquest of Ethiopia—and they believed change was in the best interests of the Somalis. The pre-Fascist government did not extend its effective rule beyond a small portion of the southern region of Somalia. The Fascist regime applied a unitary administration over the entire territory, attempting to stamp out the inter-clan conflicts that were sapping so much political energy and were adding to the expense of maintaining the colony. The conquest of Ethiopia required nurturing the nascent Somali consciousness, without, however, permitting the creation of modern Somali nationalism. The pro-Arab policy of Fascism reinforced Somalia's pro-Islamic orientation, and this meant strengthening the authority of the *Shari'a*. Such education as there was—primarily to supply the Somali clerks and other semi-skilled personnel required by the expanded administration—was provided almost entirely by mission schools.

The major change, however, came from economic policies. The Fascists boasted that they could transform deserts into fertile fields. The main effort was concentrated on Libya and not on Somalia, but Somalia also came under the impact of the Fascist credo of "Action." Although the economy was geared essentially to the needs of the mother country and the major gains accrued to Italian agricultural concessions and commercial enterprises, the agricultural programs were not without benefit to the Somalis. A limited well-drilling program was instituted, and indigenous food production doubled during the decade before the war. The main road, port, and communication systems that exist today were constructed during the Fascist period. The present industrial and com-

mercial firms were established as the result of the stimulation given by the Fascist government.

Italian occupation made no substantial contribution to the political development of the population, for the Italian approach was paternalistic, requiring little alteration of traditional political institutions. Policy did not permit the growth of institutions of self-government or of indigenous political parties. In this regard, Italian administration differed little from that obtaining in Kenya, British Somaliland, and French Somaliland, as well as in the Somali regions of Ethiopia.

Fascism was undoubtedly harsh and perhaps even brutal in some respects. But the significant point is that Fascist policies did bring about some changes. However minor these changes may have been, they initiated the transition of the Somalis from an exclusively African society to one tempered, if only lightly, by modern civilization.

World War II and the United Nations

The most important stimuli toward self-government and independence for the dependent peoples of Africa have been World War II and the United Nations. In Somalia, the first in the chain of stimuli was the British Administration which, during its occupation from 1941 to 1950, accelerated the process of transition already begun under the Italian occupation. The British encouraged Somalis to establish secular elementary and secondary schools. Various forms of consultative organs of local government were introduced. The Fascist ban on indigenous political organizations was lifted and the formation of political clubs was officially or unofficially encouraged. As a result of political and educational activity during the British period, there were three political associations by 1946, and although they were not yet true political parties, an organic basis for nationalist aspirations had been established.

Still greater impetus toward the formation of modern nationalism and political advancement came from the activities of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations.

Comments by the Council on the eventual independence of the former Italian colonies and the statement in the Italian Peace Treaty that the colonies would be disposed of "in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants"[3] were viewed by many Somalis as instruments of liberation. An announcement that the Council of Foreign Ministers would send a Four Power Commission to visit the territory early in 1948 to solicit the "views of the local population"[4] set off an intense political struggle. Previously, the political parties had been poorly organized and had enjoyed little support. With the coming of the Commission, parties began to multiply and to recruit members, draft party programs, and strengthen their organizations, each outbidding the other in efforts to produce the largest party register as proof that it represented the majority will. The nation now had meaning, as indicated by the wide demand of tribal and political leaders for eventual national independence. This movement was, however, confined primarily to the urban centers. The nomads remained apart from the new political developments.

The failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to come to any agreement concerning disposal of the Italian colonies shifted responsibility to the General Assembly. The Council submitted the question for consideration by the General Assembly on 15 September 1948, in accordance with its obligation under Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty.[5] On 21 November 1949, the Assembly recommended, in its Resolution 289B (IV), that Somalia receive its independence ten years from the date of approval of the Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly. The resolution provided that Italy, the Administering Authority, would be "aided

[3] Treaty of Peace with Italy, 10 Feb. 1947, Annex XI. *United Nations Treaty Series,* Vol. 49, No. I. 747, 1950 (New York, United Nations, 1951). English text pp. 126-235.

[4] Benjamin Rivlin, *Italian Colonies,* United Nations Action Series, No. 1 (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), p. 18. This pamphlet contains a description of the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council discussions on Somalia, as well as Libya and Eritrea. For greater detail, see G. H. Becker, Jr., *The Disposition of the Italian Colonies, 1941-1951* (Annemasse, Imprimerie Grandchamp, 1952).

[5] Four Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies, *Report on Somaliland,* 2 vols. (London, 1948). (Mimeographed.)

and advised" by an Advisory Council, composed of representatives of Colombia, Egypt, and the Philippines and headquartered in Somalia. The General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council were given the right of initiative in proposing the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement.

After the Assembly adopted the resolution, the Trusteeship Council established a Committee for Italian Somaliland and entrusted it with the task of drafting the Trusteeship Agreement. The Agreement that emerged[6] is a unique document when compared with other Trusteeship Agreements. It was stipulated that the Advisory Council—the United Nations watchdog in Somalia—would be kept informed by Italy on all matters relating to the political, social, economic, and educational advancement of the Somalis. The Advisory Council was given the power to make any observations and recommendations it considered necessary for attaining the objectives of the Agreement. In addition to the usual obligations under Article 87 of the United Nations Charter, the Agreement imposed on the Administering Authority the obligation to establish political institutions, promote the economic advancement, self-sufficiency, and social progress of the inhabitants, and establish "as rapidly as possible" a system of education. Article 20 required the Administering Authority to guarantee complete freedom of speech, press, and petition, without discrimination. A major departure from the usual agreements was the special annex, which contains a "Declaration of Constitutional Principles" guaranteeing the rights of the inhabitants and the development of institutions designed to promote complete self-government and independence. The Agreement was approved by the Assembly on 2 December 1950.

Establishment of the timetable of ten years, creation of the Advisory Council, the fact that the General Assembly itself was given the right of initiative in proposing the terms of the Agreement, and the Declaration of Constitutional Principles all placed the United Nations in a special relationship with

[6] *Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration,* Sales No. 1951.VI.A.1 (New York, United Nations, 1951).

the Trust Territory of Somalia. But did this relationship mean that the General Assembly had a special obligation toward Somalia that it did not have toward other Trust Territories? Legal purists could say that the obligations to Somalia consisted only of ensuring that the Administering Authority carried out its duties under the Agreement. Others could insist that by creating the state of Somalia and establishing special machinery for it, the Assembly had an implied obligation to extend active and substantial assistance to Somalia in the effort to attain the main goals of the Trusteeship Agreement.

Given the heritage of the past and the legacies of the social system, the Assembly's resolution called for a revolution, not an evolution, of Somali society. The population as a whole was politically immature and illiterate. The territory lacked economic resources, and tribalism constituted the basic element in Somali life. Could a viable, modern, and democratic state be created from this welter of difficulties within the span of ten years? Could modern education proceed fast enough to provide the Somalis with the concepts, knowledge, and skill necessary to run a modern state? Could the economy be made sufficiently strong to sustain the costs of democracy and independence? It was left to the Administering Authority, with the aid and advice of the Advisory Council, to construct the details of the political, economic, and educational devices through which the transformation from a colony to an independent state could take place. But to the Somalis alone was willed the task of transcending in a decade the traditions of a millennium.

Shaping of the Somali State and Democracy

THE IMMEDIATE TASK of the Administering Authority, the *Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia* (AFIS), was stated in the Trusteeship Agreement. It was required to

> foster the development of free political institutions and promote the development of the inhabitants of the Territory towards independence; and to this end . . . give to the inhabitants of the Territory a progressively increasing participation in the various organs of Government.[7]

Achievement of these aims within a span of ten years was a difficult task—a governmental structure had to be built from the ground up. The Western framework prescribed by the General Assembly had to be adapted to the traditions of a people to whom modern concepts of the state and democracy were alien. The disparate team of conservative tribal nomads, on the one hand, and the more dynamic and progressive urban population, on the other, had to be put into harness. National and local institutions had to be established and the people trained in the responsibilities of self-government. Electoral procedures had to be developed, national loyalty had to supersede tribal loyalties, and a constitution, along with a sense of constitutionalism, had to be created.

National Organs

The first step in political transition was prescribed by Article 4 of the Declaration of Principles; it provided that a national consultative organ, the Territorial Council, be appointed by the Administration. Legislative authority was to be exercised by the Administration, in consultation with the

[7] Article 3, para. 1.

Territorial Council, until the establishment of a full-fledged statutory and elected legislature.

AFIS was aware that any central organ of government that depended on representation from the tribes, with their particularistic interests, might be called upon to appease so many conflicting demands that it would fail to operate effectively. But the composition of the Territorial Council had to reflect the "majority will," traditionalism, and therefore tribal representation far exceeded representation from the political parties. It soon became clear that the younger, progressive elements were better equipped to handle national issues than were the tradition-bound representatives of the tribes, and political party representation was progressively increased after the first year.

The Territorial Council provided the first opportunity for Somalis to gather in a central organ of government in order to confront national issues. From 1950 to 1955, AFIS submitted ninety-five ordinances and decrees dealing with such complex and technical subjects as regulations governing production and sale of cotton, organization of the school system, public works, mineral concessions, and the judicial and administrative systems. Besides being exposed to the substantive material, the councillors were trained in the intricacies of a modern parliamentary system. On the recommendation of the Advisory Council and a United Nations Visiting Mission, legislative committees and legislative offices were created to broaden the Somalis' experience. By 1955, not only had the councillors shown a growing capacity to manipulate the new instruments of government, but they had also manipulated them with considerable enthusiasm: in one Council session, 982 speeches were made.

During the life of the Territorial Council, the main difficulty experienced was the intransigence of tribal leaders on measures seeking to modernize traditional institutions. An attempt by the Administration to establish a land-registry law was vociferously opposed on the ground that it unduly tampered with the established system of communal holdings. An ordinance that sought to substitute periodic elections for

the traditional custom of electing chiefs for life was similarly rejected. The differences in approach are best represented by an incident involving the Sultan of the Bimals and the president of the modernist party, the Somali Youth League (SYL). The latter had called for the immediate end of the traditional custom of collective punishment. Whereupon the Sultan rejoined: "Even God, in his infinite omnipotence, took six days to create the world."[8] But tribal chiefs joined with political party leaders on issues that both regarded as affecting national matters. They passed unanimous motions condemning British transfer of part of British Somaliland to Ethiopia[9] and guaranteeing that the future Somali state would protect and honor all foreign investments.

For AFIS, the Territorial Council was a useful instrument for obtaining Somali cooperation. By submitting all major ordinances and decrees to the Council for advice, and by accepting Somali recommendations in practically every instance, AFIS was able to alleviate the strong suspicion that nationalists held toward its aims in the Territory. The timetable also played a significant role. Both the Somalis and the Administration recognized that the target date for independence did not permit the luxury of extremism. AFIS had to devolve political authority and the Somalis had to grasp the new techniques of government.

For the Somalis, the molding of government involved education and practice in the first stage of transition, 1950-55,[10] the exercise of power in the second stage, 1956-60. In May 1956, several months after Somalia had passed the halfway mark toward independence, the Territorial Council was transformed into a seventy-man elected legislature with full statutory powers over legislation dealing with domestic affairs. (The Administrator retained the right of absolute veto.)

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[8] Consiglia Territoriale, *Verbali,* 2 Oct. 1951 (Mogadiscio, AFIS, 1951). (Mimeographed.)

[9] See p. 388 for discussion of the Haud and Reserved Area dispute.

[10] See AFIS, *Results and Prospects of the Italian Trusteeship Administration of Somaliland on Completion of Half the Trusteeship Period* (Rome, Litografia Marves, 1955).

In the general elections, the Somali Youth League won 43 seats, becoming the majority party. The Hisbia Dighil Mirifle received 13 seats, while two other parties won the remaining 4. Ten Italian, Arab, and Indian deputies were elected, but they were expected only to contribute toward resolving economic and social problems and not to engage in partisan debates on political questions. Abdullahi Issa, a leader of the SYL, formed the first all-Somali cabinet.

Up to 1 May 1957, all draft laws proposed by the ministers had to be submitted to the Administrator for approval before they could be voted upon, and until February 1957 Italian counsellors were attached to the Somali ministers. The counsellors have since been replaced by Italian experts directly responsible to their Somali superiors. Since none of the Somali cabinet ministers have much formal training, they have been dependent on substantive advice, but this has not interfered with their independence of decision.

The operations of the Legislative Assembly show a greater political sophistication than those of the Territorial Council. The elderly tribal chiefs, with their toga-like robes, have been replaced by European-dressed younger men, almost all of whom have served as party leaders in the local branches. The change in age and dress signifies a change in approach. The new leaders are using their power to bring about detribalization and modernization. A 1938 ordinance defining the powers of the chiefs was scrapped, and in its place legislation was passed that vaguely indicated what the chiefs should do under the direct control of Somali administrators. (Stipends for the traditional leaders were, however, prudently continued.) The system of collective punishments was altered in the direction of increased, but not total, individual responsibility. Somali District Commissioners were temporarily made district judges until such time as trained Somali lawyers could replace them in this function. Customary law would eventually have to bend to a modern penal code. Judges of Islamic law (khadis) were stripped of all jurisdiction over criminal matters, and their jurisdiction over civil

matters was reduced. It became illegal for political parties to carry tribal names. The spirit was a new one.

The 100-odd laws, motions, and resolutions passed so far, and the manner in which they have been passed, augur well for the future. There has been a growing sense of political maturity and responsibility among Somali leaders. The period 1947-49 was marked with violence between the Somali Youth League and Italians and pro-Italian Somalis. In 1949 Abdullahi Issa told the United Nations General Assembly that the Somalis "preferred death to Italian rule."[11] From 1950 through much of 1953, the political scene was characterized by SYL riots and AFIS reprisals. But the mood changed with governmental responsibility. When AFIS, in October 1957, announced that it was prepared to relinquish the Trusteeship before the deadline should the Somali government so request, the offer was not accepted. Abdullahi Issa, now the Prime Minister, took special pains to acknowledge the substantial contributions of Italy, which, he said, "had returned to the noble tradition of the Risorgimento, a tradition rooted in the brotherhood of men and in the support of oppressed peoples struggling to gain their independence."[12] Practical considerations required continued AFIS aid and guidance. Somali leaders had become aware of the magnitude of the difficulties facing the nascent state.

Local Government

In order to widen participation by Somalis in the governmental process, AFIS established two types of local government bodies: the District Councils in the rural areas, and the Municipal Councils in the towns and villages.

Since the end of World War II, district councils with statutory powers have been operating effectively in the settled

[11] United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records* (GAOR): 4th Sess., 1st Cmtte., 288th Mtg., 7 Oct. 1949, para. 25; also, *ibid.*, 290th Mtg., 10 Oct. 1949.

[12] *Messaggero* (Rome), 3 March 1957. There were also speeches supporting the Administration on Radio Mogadiscio in December 1957. Even more important, other pro-Italian statements were made by members of the SYL Central Committee during that party's congress in Mogadiscio in the spring of 1958.

areas of Kenya and Tanganyika. In Somalia similar bodies have existed since 1939, but not until the period of the Trusteeship were their functions clearly defined. Presently they are composed of chiefs and notables, elected in the tribal assemblies, and local political party representatives. The function of the District Council is to aid the District Commissioner, the representative of the central government in the district, in the administration of the area under his jurisdiction. Basically, the Councils are concerned with matters involving customary law and with settlement of disputes over grazing and watering rights. District Commissioners are required to seek the advice of the Councils on social, cultural, and economic programs that affect the district.

AFIS hoped to utilize the District Councils as the main instrument for the civic education of the nomads, and it expected to grant them financial, executive, and legislative powers. But the District Councils have failed to develop into effective organs of modern local government. The obstacles to their development stem from the very nature of Somali nomadic society. During the course of a year, a nomadic family searching for water and pasturage may move into or pass through several districts. The nomads have no concept of artificial territorial divisions and no civic identification with one area labelled "district." Only the rain cycle determines the domain of the nomad.

The issues affecting the interests of the nomads deal with peace and survival, not roads, schools, or other projects that seem to them remote from their daily needs. When families are on the move and competition for pasturage and water is great, tension and friction come easily and tempers flare. Hunger may incite a raid on another family's stock, and a raid may develop into open conflict between large clans. Customary treaties, called *testur,* govern the relations between kinship groups and are often invoked to bring about the arbitration of disputes and to determine compensation for physical injuries and fatalities resulting from conflicts. The District Councils have been instrumental in minimizing hostilities and in resolving some of the conflicts, but they

have proved too unwieldy to be relied upon completely. Consequently, it is the task of the central government, through its district officers and mobile police, who are efficiently and effectively organized, to maintain surveillance over and to control nomadic movements, to act swiftly should there be signs of growing tension, and to persuade, even compel, a reconciliation within the framework established by the *testur*.

No steps have been taken either by AFIS or the Somali government during the past eight years to alter the powers of the District Councils. They remain consultative bodies, despite the pleas of the Advisory Council that "no efforts should be spared" to grant the Councils more autonomy[13] and the insistence of the United Nations Visiting Mission that they constitute "a potentially most important instrument" in effecting a transition from the traditional system to a democratic system.[14] Educated Somali administrators would view any increase in the powers of the District Councils as strengthening not the forces of democracy but the forces of tribalism. Thus it seems certain that government in the pastoral areas will continue to consist of strong control by the District Commissioners and other officers of the central government.

In contrast to the District Councils, the Municipal Councils of the towns and villages have shown a large measure of adaptability to the requirements of modern local government. Prior to the Trusteeship, only the capital city, Mogadiscio, had its own Council. In 1951 AFIS created 27 Municipal Councils with consultative powers. By 1956 the Municipal Councils had been increased to 48 and transformed into elected, largely autonomous bodies. The key to their development has been the assignment of secretaries, trained in municipal administration, to the Councils to aid the elected councillors, the majority of whom have insufficient education to handle the complex matters of census, registry, public

[13] Report of the United Nations Advisory Council, 1957-58: United Nations Doc. T/1372, 22 Apr. 1958, para. 57.

[14] United Nations Visiting Mission Report, 1957: United Nations Doc. T/1344, 4 Dec. 1957, para. 59.

services, and town planning. During the period 1956–59, Italian financial experts have assisted the Councils in preparing their budgets and have maintained a close watch on contracts and expenditures.

The progress in municipal government is indicated by the improvement of the budgetary positions of the municipalities. Some of them have become financially independent, although they must still rely on the central government for major development expenditures.

The Minister of the Interior may remove mayors and may dissolve the Municipal Councils "for reasons of public policy." Furthermore, all matters dealing with personnel, public services, rates and taxes, finance, property, and town planning are subject to the approval of the regional head, the Prefect.[15] These rather extensive limitations on the Municipal Councils were criticized by the Advisory Council as being "so wide as to constitute a threat to the independence of the municipalities."[16] But since there is a marked tendency for politically conscious Somalis to equate government centralization with nationalism, it is doubtful that the present system can be revised to any large degree.

The Electoral System

When the Italian government assumed the Trusteeship there were a number of political parties in the Territory, but they had had no experience with a modern electoral system. The United Nations and AFIS regarded the gradual extension of suffrage as indispensable because of the political immaturity of the people and the parties' lack of experience. Such a gradual introduction would serve an educational purpose for both the electorate and the parties. It would stimulate the parties to greater activity and encourage the population to share in politics and government. From 1954 to the present, four electoral laws have been passed, and

[15] *Bollettino Ufficiale,* No. 10 (Mogadiscio, AFIS Printing Press, 30 Sept. 1956), Title V.

[16] Report of the United Nations Advisory Council, 1956-57: United Nations Doc. T/1311, 22 Apr. 1957, para. 105 (ii).

Somali participation in the three elections held to date has steadily increased.[17]

The conduct of the municipal direct and secret-ballot elections of 1954 and 1958 was most satisfactory. In 1954, suffrage was confined to adult males, while in 1958 it included men and—much to the surprise of many who insisted it could never be done—women. The municipal elections proceeded with order, and with an enthusiasm labeled in the local press *alla moda americana.* In the 1954 elections, 75.1 per cent of the eligible electors voted; and in 1958, 85.5 per cent.

In contrast, the voting procedure employed in the interior in the 1956 general elections proved highly unsatisfactory. The number of votes recorded was equal to one-half of the total population, although it should not have exceeded 300,000, taking into account that women and persons under the age of twenty-one were excluded from voting. In the towns, the elections were conducted on the basis of universal male suffrage, with secret ballots; but in the interior they were based on the traditional *shir,* in which the nomads voted for tribal leaders who, in turn, cast a multiple vote valued in proportion to the number of registered electors in the group. Inadequate supervision encouraged dishonesty. Some leaders sold their votes and others inflated the numbers.

After analyzing the results of the 1956 elections, the Trusteeship Council expressed the hope that the electoral system would be improved and that a census of the rural population would be taken. The Advisory Council also emphasized the desirability of taking an accurate census before the 1959 elections to choose a Constituent Assembly. In 1957–58, AFIS and the Somali government made a conscientious, and costly, effort to secure a registration of the nomads. But the operation was unsuccessful. For reasons of prestige and from a failure to understand the significance of census-taking, chiefs in the nomadic areas were eager to report an impressive number of tribesmen. Some submitted figures that exceeded the *total* population of the country.

[17] See chart of Somali election returns, p. 358.

Despite the failure of the census, the Somali government is proceeding with elections this spring. They will be held by a free, direct, and secret ballot, with an electorate composed of all Somali citizens who have completed eighteen years of age. The Territory is to be constituted into a single electoral college and each political party must present a nation-wide listing of candidates. When the final results are computed, the Judge of Appeals will allot to each party a number of seats in proportion to the number of votes it has received. Citizens of both sexes who have reached the age of twenty-five and who are literate in Italian or Arabic will be eligible for election.

It may be assumed that in the forthcoming elections the nomad will vote according to the consensus of his tribe rather than on the basis of an individual choice. This should not, however, detract from the contribution the elections will make to the political advancement of Somalia. The nomads will be brought into direct contact with a new political process for the first time. Above all, the electoral system constitutes a bold attempt to individualize Somali thinking and to bring women into the political life of the nation.

The Political Parties

During the British Administration, there were nine political parties. The number increased to twenty-one prior to the 1954 elections, reflecting the desire of the political leader of each major locality and tribe to have his own party. Many of these local parties disappeared when it became evident that that they could not produce enough votes in the 1956 general elections to capture any seats in the Legislative Assembly. By the 1958 elections, only five parties were sufficiently well organized to win Municipal Council seats. The effect of the electoral laws was to bring about the consolidation of political parties and to check their original tendency to proliferate.

The largest party in Somalia—and the one likely to dominate the independent nation—is the Somali Youth League.

SOMALI MUNICIPAL AND GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS

Party	1954 Municipal Election		1956 General Election		1958 Municipal Election	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
SYL	17,982	141	333,820	43	39,178	416
HDM (HDMS)	8,198	57	159,967	13	38,214	175
UGB	2,273	5	21,630	--	6,322	6
GSL	------	---	-------	--	10,125	36
Liberal	------	---	-------	--	11,004	27
GFS	------	---	-------	--	341	3
SDP	------	---	80,866	3	------	---
U. Merehan	------	---	11,358	1	------	---
GAA	------	---	3,441	--	------	---
UGSH	------	---	1,846	--	------	---
Scidle	954	8	1,550	--	------	---
Bagiuni	------	---	426	--	------	---
PDA	------	---	5	--	------	---
UAS	2,584	28	------	--	------	---
LPS	1,681	22	------	--	------	---
UNS	1,137	9	------	--	------	---
Palma	415	3	------	--	------	---
UPS	1,759	4	------	--	------	---
AGA	351	---	------	--	------	---
Ancora	125	1	------	--	------	---
Muosada	124	---	------	--	------	---
Leopardo	24	---	------	--	------	---
Abgalia	47	3	------	--	------	---
UDS	43	---	------	--	------	---
TOTAL	37,697	281	614,909	60	105,184	663

NOTE: The number of votes required to elect a Municipal Council member has varied, with fewer needed for election to Councils in smaller communities.

Compiled from: *Corriere della Somalia* (Mogadiscio), 23 Apr. 1954 and 10 Nov. 1958; and AFIS, *Le Prime Elezioni politiche in Somalia* (Mogadiscio, 1956), p. 226.

This party was created, with official or unofficial British encouragement, in 1943 as the nationalist party *par excellence*. Its political program sought detribalization and a "Greater Somalia" made up of the five Somali regions; it was violently anti-Italian. The SYL's leadership came chiefly from the young and progressive elements of the towns. Although originally deriving its support predominantly from the Samaale ethnic group (which, in any event, accounts for 75 per cent of the population), the SYL has recently been successful in organizing party branches in Sab areas as well.

The main opposition party, the Somali Independent Constitutional Party (HDMS), was organized in 1947 as a counter-weight to SYL—and Samaale—dominance. Formerly known as the Hisbia Dighil Mirifle (HDM), it was pro-Italian and "conservative" in orientation. Although its aims were national, the HDMS was composed almost exclusively of the Sab, the southern cultivators.

Since 1956, the HDMS has accused the government of monopolizing administrative and police posts, about 85 per cent of which are presently staffed by Samaale. But the Sab comprise only 25 per cent of the Somali population, and it does not appear that the HDMS will ever be in a position to become the government party. It is for this reason that the president of the HDMS, Gelani Scheck, noted at the party's convention in May 1958 that "the party has become convinced that the only method of unifying the Somalis . . . is through a federal constitution which accords full regional autonomy."[18] The HDMS appears to be calling for an autonomous Upper Giuba region, where the Sab comprise the vast majority.

Prior to the 1958 municipal elections, a dispute arose within the SYL between its president, Hagi Mohamed Hussein, and Aden Abdullah, the president of the Legislative Assembly. The former took a pro-Egyptian and a vigorous anti-AFIS stand. The moderate wing of the SYL, led by Aden Abdullah and the SYL cabinet ministers, called for

[18] *Testo discorso sul anniversario XI⁰ del partito HDMS, 25 Marzo 1958,* from the author's private collection. (Mimeographed.)

and obtained Hagi Mohamed's expulsion. He then founded a new party, the Greater Somalia League (GSL), which had as its major aim the unification of the five Somali regions. This issue could be expected to appeal especially to the Darods, a division of the larger Samaale group, whose co-tribesmen make up the majority of the Somalis in the total Somali region. By thus trying to undermine one of the bases of SYL support, Hagi Mohamed Hussein was able to pick up some votes in the 1958 municipal elections. But the government has restrained recent GSL demonstrations, and many leading Darods, including the Minister of Interior, remained in the SYL. It does not seem likely that the GSL will offer any serious threat to SYL supremacy in the coming elections.

The other two important parties, the Liberal Party and the Benadir Youth Union (UGB), also depend on tribal support. In the 1958 elections, the leader of the Liberal Party, Hagi Boracco, was able to gain a substantial following among the Abgal section of the Hawiye. The UGB has consistently received support from the "tribe" of Mogadiscio, the Rer Hamar. Neither party is capable of gaining national support.

The fact that traditional tribal associations have operated in Somali politics should not obscure the real political transition in Somalia. Since the establishment of the Trusteeship, and particularly since the first elections, Islamic solidarity and nationalism have pervaded all political parties. Political rallies are a graphic index to the three forces that make up present-day Somali politics. Invariably, the political leaders begin a meeting with citations from the Koran, pass on to the merits of the tribe, and finally stress the needs of the Somali people. Tribal differences have not prevented political party leaders from focusing attention on national goals and spreading the thought-patterns of nationalism. Nor have these differences prevented them from viewing and resolving problems in their national context. Although the HDMS vigorously opposed the SYL government's program in 1956,

it has since 1957 voted with the SYL on practically all major issues affecting the general interests of the nation.

The Constitution and Constitutionalism

During 1959 the Constituent Assembly will be elected and will vote on the Constitution of the Republic of Somalia. The draft constitution[19] represents the culmination of Somali and Italian efforts to superimpose a modern political structure on the traditional society. Drafted by Italian legal experts, with assistance from Somalis who have had experience in politics, administration, and Islamic law, it has been considered by a special committee composed of members of the major political parties. It seems likely that the draft will be adopted with only slight modification.

The Somali draft constitution resembles that of Italy; the organization of government, the restrictions on the exercise of governmental power, and the guarantees of civil and social rights are spelled out in detail. It is, essentially, a democratic instrument based on Western models. But will it be the "law of the land," or will it be only a statement of ideals?

Experience elsewhere in Africa seems to show that where Western constitutionalism is superimposed on an African structure, the constitution tends to be nominal—merely a declaration of constitutional intent. The gap between intention and implementation has been similarly pronounced in Somalia, and there is no reason to suppose that the pattern will change with the achievement of independence.

There is little doubt that the Somali educated class and political leaders are strongly influenced by modern democratic ideals. The Declaration of Constitutional Principles of the Trusteeship Agreement has had a particularly strong impact on their thinking. The majority of the politically conscious Somalis, including HDMS leaders, would agree with Abdullahi Issa's statement that "the Somali nationalist move-

[19] Comitato tecnico per Studi e Lavori preparatori per la Costituzione della Somalia, *Proposte per un progetto* [draft constitution], from the author's private collection. (Mimeographed.)

ment is fundamentally and sincerely founded on democratic ideals. There must be liberty for all the people, and their rights must be considered inviolable."[20]

But the difficulties of implementing intentions were underscored when the Legislative Assembly, in December 1958, granted the government emergency powers for twelve months. As one deputy pointed out:

> If the internal security and stability of the nation are threatened by any source whatever, we must apply all means necessary to suppress the source, as other African governments, such as Ghana, have done in order to preserve the vitality of the nation's institutions.[21]

The formula is first stability, then democracy.

The obstacles to the establishment of effective constitutionalism may be found in the history of Somali politics and nationalism. In the past, opposition to government authority was put down by force, not by persuasion. There was not the give and take, the element of compromise, that characterizes the interplay of interests in more advanced democracies. Once the Somali government was established, the SYL, because it had borne the brunt of the nationalist struggle, could not avoid regarding itself as the exclusive guardian of nationalism and national goals. It could permit opposition and criticism, but any threat to the power position of the party itself was viewed—and is presently viewed —as an act of treason against Somali nationalism. To the SYL, the HDMS bears the stigma of having been considered the creature of the Italian Administration, organized to combat the SYL and its goal of nationalism. The GSL is regarded as an instrument of Egyptian influence, and the Liberal Party has been accused of receiving its party funds from the Ethiopian government. Thus the SYL has been reluctant to allow members of other political parties to hold positions of influence.

However, the concept of nationalism has spread only to the political and educated elite and to the inhabitants of

[20] *Messaggero*, 3 March 1957.
[21] *Corriere della Somalia* (Mogadiscio), 10 Dec. 1958.

the towns and villages. The majority of the nomads, although they possess an acute Somali national consciousness in the historical sense, have not yet accepted the modern nationalist credo with its concomitant civic obligations and duties. Many political leaders themselves remain psychologically bound by their tribal associations.

In the realm of civil and social rights there are Somali traditions that are compatible with Western democratic concepts. The right of every man to speak freely in the tribal assembly is an inviolable law. All important decisions are taken by majority vote of the men of the tribe, and tribal leaders are elected in the same way. But there is a great deal that departs from the general pattern of Western constitutionalism, for example, the "outcaste" group, the subordinate status of women, and the practice of private vendetta in cases of homicide.

Somali political leaders face two essential tasks: the maintenance of the nation-state and the making of democracy. It is not unreasonable for the political elite to be primarily concerned with the first goal. When this is attained, and many believe it can be achieved only through a powerful central government, the nominal constitutional may be transformed into a normative one.

Transformation Through Education

FROM THE BEGINNING AFIS regarded education as the key to the entire process of change, and the advancement made in this field is one of the outstanding achievements of the Trusteeship period. A Five Year Program for Educational Development worked out in cooperation with UNESCO was initiated in 1952. Somalia is the only Trust Territory in which such a plan has been prepared in collaboration with UNESCO.

Educational Advancement

From necessity the Somali government and AFIS are stressing development in the towns and villages. It is there that Western civilization has had the greatest impact and where, quantitatively, considerable educational progress has been made. In 1948 there were an estimated 1,222 students enrolled in all schools. By the 1957–58 scholastic year the figures had increased significantly: 31,524 children and adults enrolled in primary schools; 246 pupils in the two levels of secondary school; 336 in technical schools; 89 students in the School of Public Finance; and 245 enrolled at the Higher Institute of Law and Economics, at least two-thirds of whom study by correspondence and go to Mogadiscio only for examinations. There is also a School of Islamic Discipline with an enrollment of 147 studying to become magistrates of the Moslem law courts and teachers of Arabic. The normal school has 33 students. In 1950 there were only 475 female pupils; in 1958, approximately 5,000. In addition, AFIS has a broad overseas scholarship program. From 1953 through 1957, 742 Somalis were sent to Italy for specialized

training and university education. Approximately 170 Somalis are studying in Egyptian secondary schools and at El Azhar University under scholarship grants from Egypt. Another handful are studying in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

One of the serious consequences of rapid education in African societies is the wide gap created between the illiterate and the educated, and particularly between the old generation and the new. AFIS has sought to narrow the breach by its program of adult education and by establishing school committees comprising notables, elders, and religious leaders. However, the goal of 19,600 adults in fundamental education set by the Five Year Plan has been missed by several thousand and the record of regular attendance has been only 60 per cent.

There are some major shortcomings in primary and secondary education and in teacher training. The enrollment in the primary day schools of 13,783 is considerably less than the Plan's goal of 22,080. Besides, there has been a high degree of wastage through pupils' not completing the full primary school schedule. The Visiting Mission of 1957 and UNESCO correctly attribute this to inadequately prepared Somali teachers and to the frustration engendered among the pupils because of the need to learn Arabic or Italian, the languages of instruction. The number of pupils who actually graduate from secondary school is only about 25 per cent of enrollment. Since these are the main source of clerical employees for government and commerce and the only source of students for the university and teacher training, the bottleneck in secondary education retards the over-all development program. The major obstacle to increased enrollment is that the only secular secondary school in the Territory is located in Mogadiscio, and few pupils from other areas are able or willing to leave their families for the long academic year in spite of the fact that boarding facilities are available for them. The problem of recruiting teachers is further complicated by the great disparity in salaries of teachers and civil servants and to the higher

prestige value that attends administrative positions. AFIS estimates that after 1960 Somalia will require 70 foreign teachers, but unless the Somali government revises its salary scales and combats the declining morale of the teachers, the estimate will have to be increased.

In response to early criticisms that little was being done to educate the nomads, AFIS, with UNESCO assistance, established two projects of fundamental education. The one at Dinsor is for semi-nomads whose limited migratory movements permit some continuity in class attendance. Handicrafts, health measures, and new techniques in farming and animal husbandry have been taught in conjunction with a campaign against illiteracy. The success attained has encouraged the government to establish another such project among the Mobilen semi-nomads. The Afmedu project, which unsuccessfully sought to provide a similar, but more elementary, fundamental education program for nomads, has been abandoned on recommendation of its UNESCO director. One reason for its failure may have been that the Somali Minister of Social Affairs did not give the project his support—possibly because it was being conducted among a tribal group for which he had little affection, but more likely because he was too impatient to wait for results. In any event, it is most difficult to devise techniques, at reasonable costs, for coping effectively with the special problems of education in a highly segmented and widely dispersed society that is frequently on the move.

Unlike the town dwellers, the nomads have little comprehension of the purpose of modern education, and the nomadic economy and tradition militate against its introduction. Marriage comes at an early age and school-age children perform important economic functions. Outside of the towns, education consists chiefly of passing on, from generation to generation, the oral literature, which gives instruction in clan customs, the Somali language, and modes of behavior. At Koranic "bush schools" children receive some instruction in the tenets of Islam and learn familiar passages from the Koran in Arabic.

The implications for national administration and government stemming from the inability to introduce modern methods of education among the nomadic population are clear. The nomads for some time will remain apart from the progressive political developments of the sedentary areas, and it may be difficult to get them to share in such obligations of citizenship as taxation.

A high priority has been given to vocational education, and AFIS with the aid of experts from UNESCO and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), has designed a program that seeks to assure the talent necessary to sustain the technical services of the state. There are five institutions that give training in agriculture, fishing and navigation, the domestic sciences, nursing, and crafts and mechanical skills. An ILO expert is assisting the last of these, the Industrial School, in reorganizing its curriculum and in designing courses for adults. Advanced specialization is provided at training centers in Italy. Of the 182 students in Italy in 1958, 118 pursued courses in technical fields. The objective of this program is to produce enough technicians to replace lower-grade non-Somali personnel. AFIS estimates that after 1960 Somalia will be in need of at least 250 experts. But since the meager economy of the nation demands intensive scientific utilization of all available natural resources, the number required may well prove to be greater.

Training an Elite

In the field of higher education the most significant accomplishment has been the rapid training of a bureaucratic elite. AFIS, the United Nations, and Somali political leaders all viewed somalization of government as the most urgent goal. In 1950 Somali civil servants occupied only the lowest grades. AFIS was criticized during the early years of administration by the Advisory Council and the Trusteeship Council for not moving more swiftly, but it persisted in its view that it was preferable first to give candidates some background in cultural, as well as technical, subjects rather than to rush them prematurely into posts of responsibility. At the same

time, it compromised with the exigencies of the timetable by refusing to require the high and rigid educational standards that have long characterized the European civil service.

In 1950 a School of Politics and Administration was created to give a broad, if elementary, understanding of law, administration, history, and economics to potential candidates for the civil service and to future political leaders. In 1954 the Administration went beyond the obligations of the Trusteeship Agreement by establishing the Higher Institute of Law and Economics in Mogadiscio. The Institute provides advanced theoretical training in the disciplines offered by the School and is now affiliated with the University of Rome, where graduates of the Institute receive two years of advanced credit. For the majority of potential administrators, who did not have time to pursue the university degree, a special eighteen-month program at the University of Rome was designed.

It is difficult to exaggerate the value of the contribution these institutions have made to Somalia. Of the 4,750 Somalis now in the central and local administration, 170 hold positions of top administrative responsibility. After independence only 33 important administrative and judicial posts will have to be staffed by non-Somalis.

While the bureaucratic elite who hold the responsible administrative posts may be regarded as capable and effective, there is a serious lack of adequately trained accountants and statisticians, as well as clerical employees and stenographers. The over-all result is a slowing down of administration and a consequent delay in the implementation of policies. An attempt was made to alleviate this deficiency when the School of Politics was transformed into the School of Public Finance with a reorganized curriculum. But since there remains a shortage of secondary school graduates, the problem may not be easily overcome in the near future.

The new electoral law allows civil servants to run for political office and, upon losing the election or after having served a term as an elected official, to return to the civil service. The risks involved in breaching the principle of

separation of politics and administration—risks usually avoided or minimized in other countries—seem to be overridden by the desirability of bringing into the legislature men having a high standard of education. Since there are few such persons outside the civil service, the one major source is now being tapped.

The necessity of educating and training a Somali police force was as important to AFIS as constructing a bureaucratic elite. Here, too, the pace was rapid. In December 1952, only one police garrison was under the jurisdiction of a Somali. In December 1958, the Police Force of Somalia, a quasi-military organization consisting of 3,500 officers and men, was transferred from Italian command to the new Somali commandant, Mohamed Abshir Mussa. All posts, installations, and garrisons are now under Somali control and only a small cadre of the Italian Carabinieri, primarily training personnel, remains.

From 1953 onward, an intensive campaign against illiteracy was undertaken in the police force, which itself became an educational institution. By 1957 practically all the police had attained certificates of elementary education. Officers, and non-commissioned officers who could qualify, were sent to Mogadiscio for specialized training and the best of these were given further education in Italy. The stress was on technical education but there was a strong accent on penal and constitutional law. The officers on their own initiative have gone even further. Old textbooks and manuals left over from the British Administration have been collected and are studied avidly by an officer cadre that has never ceased to admire British discipline, law, and court procedures.

The police has emerged as the best disciplined unit in Somalia. Its almost pedantic adherence to the "law" makes it an important element in realizing the aims of state unity. Its explicit function is to provide security; it will also serve as an agent of modernization.

Somalia has yet to reap the benefits of its university graduates, since it was not until 1955 that a corps of students

was prepared to undertake such advanced work. Fifteen Somali students are expected to graduate from Italian universities in 1959, 35 in 1960, 57 in 1961, and 68 in 1962. Most of these are studying in such immediately useful fields as medicine and engineering, but it will take at least several decades to educate enough doctors, veterinarians, teachers, chemists, natural scientists, and engineers.

The Language Question

The major obstacle to educational advancement is the absence of a written national language. Unlike most African territories, Somalia has a high degree of linguistic homogeneity despite some major dialectal differences. It does not, however, have a commonly accepted script. At present the languages of instruction are Arabic and Italian, with oral Somali used in the first school years before the pupils learn another language.

There are two main questions to be resolved before a written national language of instruction can be chosen: first, whether the language should be Somali, Arabic, or Italian; and second, whether Somali should be written in Arabic, Roman, or some other script. The Advisory Council, probably as a compromise to the persuasions of its Egyptian member, showed an initial bias toward the Arabic language, on the ground that its use is already widespread among the Somalis. Actually, Arabic is well known only by town merchants, educators, religious leaders, and government personnel. Outside this group, the acquaintance of the population with Arabic is restricted to Koranic phrases that have been learned by rote.

The Trusteeship Council has frequently stressed that education can proceed rapidly only if Somali is reduced to written form and used as the language of instruction, at least in the early years. This view has been reiterated by the Visiting Missions and in the UNESCO reports.

But a complex of religious, inter-clan, and political conflicts prevents adoption of Somali as the official instructional

language. The one local script with a degree of recognition, Osmania, is seen by some traditionalists as exclusively a Darod language, and the major political parties seem to have admitted tacitly that inter-clan competition over the question is too great to permit its acceptance.

Somali has been transcribed in Roman and Arabic characters, but the former has been rejected because it seemed to carry a taint of Christianity, the latter because it seemed to corrupt the language of the Koran. (Since the sounds of Somali are not all found in Arabic, many new symbols had to be designed.) The rejection of a modified Arabic script for Somali suggests that the aim of modern leaders to secularize the state may have to be subordinated to the objections raised by religious leaders. An attempt by the Prime Minister to have a page of the government's newspaper published in Somali using Roman characters was greeted with such opposition that it, too, had to be abandoned. A group of Somali intellectuals was organized to stimulate interest in the adoption of the Roman script, but the group is no longer active. In any case, the practical difficulty of adopting Somali as the language of instruction before a supply of books is available on many levels and in many subjects is apparent.[22]

The Trusteeship Council has noted that the "people" must make the final choice. Whatever the merits of the various positions, the continuing language problem is impeding the development of the Somali state. Students are discouraged from attending school because they must struggle with the essentials of a foreign tongue before they can master the substantive courses. All available literature remains the preserve of a privileged few. Laws that define rights and obligations must be interpreted, often falteringly, to the people. Finally, the absence of a nationally accepted written

[22] See, on the problem of language and education, UNESCO observations in United Nations Doc. T/1062, 17 June 1953. Also D. Torelli, "L'attività delle Scuole elementari in Somalia," *Somali d'oggi,* Anno II, No. 4 (Mogadiscio, AFIS Printing Press, 31 Dec. 1957), pp. 30-35, and I. M. Lewis, "The Gadabursi Somali Script," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* Vol. XXI (London, 1958). A very detailed book is: M. N. Moreno, *Il Somalo della Somalia* (Rome, Istituto polografico dello Stato, 1955).

language inhibits further development of a virile national consciousness.

Impact of Education on the Social System

From 1950 to 1958, approximately 150,000 Somalis out of a settled population of about 350,000 were brought into contact with Western education. Although most of these have been exposed only slightly, this exposure is bound to have some effect on traditional modes of thinking.

Already significant is the changing status of women in the settled areas. In the traditional society, which is patriarchal, women have no legal rights and take no part in public life. Today there is an incipient protest against this inferior status not only by educated women but also by men who have been influenced through education by new ideas. There is growing resistance to polygamy in the towns. Women are beginning to take an active role in political parties, and the new electoral laws grant them the privileges of voting and running for political office. Increasingly women are entering teaching and nursing, fields from which they were previously excluded by custom. The process of change is a slow one, however.

Another important effect of education is its stimulation of opposition to traditional concepts of clan superiority, labor, and the custom of collective sanctions. Social stratification, in which specific groups are engaged in "low caste" occupations and in which a man's status is determined by his lineage, is gradually being broken down in the classrooms, where the idea of *rer* is being tempered by the idea of "nation" and where the "noble" are competing with the "less noble" to accumulate new skills and knowledge. Labor unions are just appearing as respectable institutions, and modern labor legislation has just been passed. These advances are due essentially to a recognition by the newly educated of the need for labor reform.

In the field of medicine, education, with its stress on modern hygienic methods, is beginning to alter traditional approaches. Women as well as men take advantage of the

services provided by infirmaries, clinics, and hospitals. Religious leaders are still sought out for the accomplishment of cures, but modern medical aid is very widely accepted. The World Health Organization and UNICEF have aided AFIS in an extensive campaign in the schools in the fight against malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases. Opposition to these new measures continues, but this barrier to social reform may be overcome as more Somalis are exposed to modern education.

Hundreds of Somalis who have received some degree of higher education are seeking to substitute the concept of individual responsibility for the indigenous custom of collective obligations. In the traditional social system, such offenses as homicide and physical injury are settled by the payment of compensation not by the individual offender but by the immediate kinship group; little distinction is made among the various types of homicide. Educated Somalis, including police officers, disapprove of a system in which twenty camels can compensate for the life of a human being. They are determined to put an end to a system that has been partly responsible for perpetuating inter-clan strife. Somalis who are seeking to abolish the customary laws that seem to run counter to Western standards of justice, equality, and individual responsibility are influenced not only by their contact with Italian concepts and institutions, but also by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, since 1950, have been given wide publicity by the political parties, the schools, the press, and the radio. The signs of social changes are still faint, but they are unquestionably there.

Economic Development and Prospects

No other phase of Somali development has had so much verbal attention lavished upon it as the economic. Studies and reports have been made by ILO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, the United States International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and AFIS. The reports and debates of the Trusteeship Council, the three Visiting Missions, the Advisory Council, and the General Assembly have been rife with alarums, resolutions, recommendations, and admonitions. It is already clear that independent Somalia will need substantial outside aid for a long time to come, but whether or not the Somalis will receive enough aid—and the extent to which the United Nations should assume responsibility for it—is still open to question.

Somalia has received an average annual subsidy of over $10,000,000[23] for the past nine years. From 1950 to June 1958, AFIS spent about $92,700,000 in Somalia, excluding Italy's indirect subsidy of a considerable portion of Somali exports. The United States, through its ICA Mission, spent approximately $2,555,000 during 1954-58. Total contributions from the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in 1956-58 amounted to $122,934, while the World Health Organization and UNICEF contributed $374,000 during those years. It is difficult to appraise the total contribution of Egypt, but some indication is given by the 1957 expenditure of $390,000 on scholarships and teachers.

[23] Figures cited in dollars are approximate.

In the first phase of its efforts to secure the economic advancement of the Territory, AFIS undertook the substantial backlog of reconstruction and repair necessitated by the war and its aftermath. During the period from 1950 to 1955, a considerable portion of public investment expenditures went into infrastructure—roads, communications, and building and equipment for educational, administrative, and health purposes. Some attempt was made to stimulate economic activity, but it was not until 1954 that a comprehensive program for developing the economic resources of the Territory could be inaugurated.

The nucleus of the second phase of AFIS development efforts was a series of Seven Year Development Plans for the period 1954-60.[24] The Development Plans, based on a number of research studies by the technical division of AFIS, the United States ICA Mission, and the United Nations agencies, envisage the total expenditure of approximately $13,700,000. About 52 per cent has been allocated for Somali agricultural and livestock development, and the remainder, for transportation, communications, and urban development. The expenditures of the Development Plans do not constitute the total public investments by AFIS on the development of Somalia, but they have provided the main stimulation to Somali production and economic improvement.

In the Development Plans, AFIS has set aside $4,358,000 for increasing indigenous agricultural production. Only some 500,000 out of the 8,000,000 cultivable hectares that make up 10 per cent of Somalia's total land area are presently under cultivation, and of this about 30,000 are being farmed on a commercial basis by 220 Italian concessionaires; subsistence farming by Somali agriculturalists and semi-nomads accounts for the rest. Prospects for improvement are limited

[24] See AFIS, *Rapport du Gouvernement italien à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur l'Administration de tutelle de la Somalie, 1957* (Rome, Istituto polografico dello Stato, 1958), pp. 39-53. Also G. F. Malagodi, *Linee programmitiche per lo sviluppo economico e sociale della Somalia* (Rome, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1953). (Mimeographed.)

by scant and irregular rainfall over most of the country, although intensive farming is possible, with irrigation, along the Uebi Scebeli and Giuba Rivers.

Among the agricultural development schemes in the Plans are irrigation projects along the middle and lower Uebi Scebeli, construction of controlled, inter-connected flood basins along the middle Giuba and of catchment basins in the dryland farming regions, and an agricultural extension service. These projects have been supplemented by introduction of modern farm implements, construction of public silos for grain storage to eliminate food scarcity during periods of drought, and establishment of experimental farms. The Plans envisage improving about 96,000 hectares of agricultural land to the benefit of some 260,000 persons.[25] Greater yields per hectare for some subsistence crops may also be possible through better seed selection and further agricultural extension work.

The most important cash crop is bananas, which accounted for 60 per cent of the Territory's total exports in 1957. But, despite tariff exemptions and other forms of preferential treatment, Somali bananas are more expensive in Italy—presently the only customer—than those which could be imported from other countries. This is due at least in part to the fact that Somali bananas are unusually perishable. IBRD, among others, has concluded that the industry cannot become sufficiently competitive to warrant its continuation under present uneconomic production and marketing procedures. Nevertheless, the Administration anticipates that production and shipping costs will decrease, and it is counting on banana exports of some 45,000 metric tons annually during the first few years after independence to provide 50 per cent of the total value of Somali exports. A Somali banana cooperative has just been formed to participate in what has heretofore been an exclusively Italian industry.

[25] Agenzia Sviluppo Economico Somalia, *Questionario relativo alle tendenze, problemi e programmi economici, 1957-58* (Mogadiscio, AFIS Printing Press, Feb. 1958). (Mimeographed.)

Other important cash crops are sugar cane and cotton. Sugar cane is produced almost exclusively by the Italo-Somalo Agricultural Society (SAIS). Prior to 1956, Somalia imported large quantities of sugar; since then, SAIS has not only provided the needs of Somalia but has also exported sugar to other areas. The company is optimistic about the future and expects greater production and increased exportation. Cotton production has fluctuated considerably, although Somalia is particularly suitable for growing long-staple cotton. Through its Development Plans AFIS hopes to have 20,000 hectares under cotton cultivation by 1960 and to equal the peak 1952 level of 15,090 quintals. AFIS has been particularly successful in encouraging Somalis to produce this cash crop; they raise 60 per cent of the crop today, whereas before World War II cotton was cultivated almost wholly on Italian concessions.

By far the most important advance has been the increased production of cereals, of which there was an export surplus in 1957 for the first time. In fact, the 1957 Visiting Mission stated that other African territories might well study the Somali experience. Another indication of some success is the small but important export trade in sesame and groundnuts.

Somalia's long-term economic growth hinges to a large degree on the success or failure of efforts to improve the livestock industry. One limiting factor in this sector is that possession of livestock, particularly camels and cattle, constitutes the nomad's index of wealth and prestige. Livestock is not sold, exchanged, or slaughtered except on special occasions or in case of absolute need. It serves as settlement for civil contracts, such as the payment of bride price and for the payment of blood money. The high social value attached to the ownership of livestock impels the nomads to accumulate as large a herd as possible despite the strain imposed on the available pasturage and water and on the quality of the stock. The object of the Administration in this sector is to restrict nomadic movements, to reduce inter-clan conflicts over scarce pasturage and water, and to develop animal husbandry into a stable economic activity. The Development Plans there-

fore provide an expenditure of about $3,430,000 to initiate these changes. A large-scale project is under way for drilling 200 deep wells and excavating 300 shallow wells by 1960. Other projects to train Somalis in modern methods of preparing hides and skins and in methods of livestock improvement have been instituted. Of these, the veterinary service has been quite successful in gaining support from the nomads.

The increase in export of livestock on the hoof by weight from 2,708 quintals in 1950 to 17,000 quintals in 1957 indicates some success in persuading the nomads to part with their stock. Export of hides and skins has not increased similarly, however, partly because Somalis, for lack of training and incentive, have not accepted modern methods of flaying. The well-construction program has been relatively successful, but the failure of AFIS to train Somalis to operate and maintain those wells that use mechanical pumps means future dependence on foreign technicians to keep them in running order. Over-grazing around some of the wells suggests a lack of coordination between the range management and water programs. These problems are complicated by the nomads' refusal to contribute to the cost of maintaining the new wells through payment of a "use" tax.

There are no large industries in Somalia comparable to those found in some other African territories. Existing industries were established mainly to serve the internal market and to a lesser extent to provide for the processing and packaging of agricultural exports. Practically all have been able to survive only because of protectionist and preferential practices. The major industrial enterprises are owned and managed by Italians. Outstanding among them is the SAIS sugar factory, which accounts for approximately half the gross value of industrial output and provides about a third of total industrial employment. The second largest enterprise, a cotton-textile mill, is now expected to be discontinued because of high production costs. The tuna, fruit-preserve, and meat-canning industries are operating below capacity either because of lack of raw materials or paucity of markets.

Somali industry is almost wholly on a local craft basis. Outstanding is the weaving of the "futa Benadir," a colored cotton cloth for which there is high demand. AFIS has encouraged Somalis to engage in economic enterprises by providing short-term low-interest loans through its Somali Credit Institute. But, although Somalis have begun to enter the construction and transportation industries, the majority of the commercial class remains Italian.

The economic development of Somalia from 1950 through 1957 entailed public investments of approximately $17,200,000 of which $8,800,000 was spent under the Seven Year Development Plans. In the sector of private capital, excluding recent investments by four oil-prospecting companies (two of them non-Italian), $9,300,000 has been invested in agriculture and industry, entirely by Italians.[26] IBRD has noted that as Somalia approaches independence, the incentive for foreign capital to make new investments or expand old ones decreases. However, the concessionaires, SAIS, and the other more important enterprises are in no hurry to leave, and the Somali government has offered substantial concessions in hopes of attracting new capital. Nevertheless, the main hope for future economic progress rests in the continuation of public investments through the Development Plans, the programs of which have passed through only their experimental stage.

The Balancing Process

One of the most difficult problems facing the Somali government is that of establishing the Territory's public finances on a sound basis. Ever since the beginning of the Italian colonial administration in 1905, the Territory has been plagued by chronic budgetary deficits. Expenditures always seem to outpace receipts, despite serious efforts by the various administrations to reduce the gap.

As far as revenue is concerned, there has always been an extreme imbalance between receipts from indirect and those from direct taxation. In the past eight years, indirect taxes

[26] *Ibid.*

have generally accounted for approximately 73 per cent of the annual receipts, with import and export duties on bananas, tobacco, textiles, and sugar constituting the bulk. Direct taxes have provided approximately 13 per cent of the revenue; the remainder has come from miscellaneous services and receipts and from income on property. AFIS and the Somali government have sought the help of the political parties, traditional leaders, and religious groups in obtaining wider support from the population in meeting state expenditures. But no substantial success has been achieved. Some small gains have been made from the extension of taxes on huts and *shambas* (small farms), but together they constitute no more than two per cent of all direct taxes. A graduated income tax recently introduced is expected to bring in additional income, and the government intends to tap other potential sources of revenue such as taxes on cattle and the use of new water facilities, which might also serve the ends of animal husbandry programs by forcing the nomads to sell more of their livestock.

Since 1950 the territorial revenue has risen, while Italian grants, which make up the budgetary deficits, have decreased, but it is not clear whether the recent increases reflect a rise in consumption of taxable imported commodities or merely an increase in prices. In any event, the deficits have diminished to some degree. (See Table 1.) AFIS earlier assumed

TABLE 1*

REVENUE

(in millions of somalos: 7.1 So. = $1 U.S.)

	1950	*1953*	*1956*	*1958*	
Territorial Revenue	21.8	31.4	44.2	52.0	(est.)
Italian Grant	118.6	65.7	57.1	49.7	
Total	140.4	97.1	101.3	101.7	

*Source: United Nations Doc. T/1372, 22 Apr. 1958, Annex VI, p. 3.

that the deficit could be substantially reduced as its military forces were diminished. But as military expenditures have decreased, other public expenditures have risen, as Table 2

TABLE 2*

EXPENDITURES
(in millions of somalos)

	1950	*1953*	*1956*	*1958*
Military	73.4	36.6	27.3†	22.9†
Other	67.0	60.5	74.0	78.8
Total	140.4	97.1	101.3	101.7

*Source: United Nations Doc. T/1372, 22 Apr. 1958, Annex VI, p. 3.
†Includes Somali forces.

indicates. Of the "Other" expenditures, civil expenditures comprise about 90 per cent, and of this approximately one-half goes for salaries, which are comparatively high because of the Somali desire to approximate local Italian wage scales. Since 1950 there has been an over-all increase in some 800 persons employed in the administration.

There is little doubt that some reduction in expenditures could be affected by a more rational organization of the administration and by salary cuts. But any such reduction, even if politically feasible, would not offset the increased expenditures entailed by expanding social services. The government has committed itself to social advancement, which is viewed by progressive Somalis as the *raison d'être* of self-government and independence. If the state is to make inroads on traditional ideology and authority, it must offer services superior to those provided by the traditional institutions.

Thus, despite the caveats entered by various United Nations bodies, it appears unlikely that there will be any reduction, and in fact expenditures will probably increase until 1962, when they are expected to level off. There may also be a rise in military expenditures if the Ethiopian border question is not settled.

Somalia's reliance on Italian grants is matched by its dependence on Italian economic activities in Somalia and on Italian trade. Italy is the main source of Somali imports, representing 75.6 per cent of the total imports by value. Exports to Italy in 1957 constituted 43 per cent of the total. Principal

world-wide exports and imports in 1957 are shown in Table 3. As in the case of the public budget, there has been a per-

TABLE 3*

Exports	%	*Imports*	%
Bananas	59.8	Machinery & Transport	30.1
Hides and Skins	8.2	Foodstuffs & Beverages	14.0
Charcoal	4.5	Manufactured Goods	28.8
Cotton	2.1	Petroleum Products	6.3
Others	25.4	Others	20.8

*Source: Compiled from AFIS, *Rapport* [*op. cit.* in footnote 24] pp. 164-182.

sistent deficit in the balance of payments. This will continue; in 1962 it is expected to be about $5,000,000 if the present level of exports and imports is maintained. No intensive effort has been made by AFIS to find new markets for Somali products. Lack of sterling compels the Somalis to purchase goods in Italian markets at costs greater than in Middle Eastern, Asian, and British markets.

Foreign Aid

"For a long period to come, certainly in excess of ten years, the Territory will be dependent upon a substantial amount of technical and financial aid from abroad."[27] This AFIS statement was repeated even more strongly by the IBRD mission, which remarked that "exceptional assistance may be needed in some degree for conceivably as much as twenty years beyond the end of the trusteeship."[28]

The Somali government regards the Bank's estimate as pessimistic and believes that the twenty-year period set by the Bank can be reduced, especially when there are fewer costly foreign experts to support and when taxation becomes a more generally accepted obligation. Nevertheless, even the AFIS report envisages an annual need for approximately

[27] AFIS, *Economic Requirements of the Territory of Somalia on the Expiration of the Trusteeship Mandate* (Rome, Istituto polografico dello Stato, June 1958), p. 4.

[28] IBRD, *The Economy of the Trust Territory of Somalia,* Report of January 1957, para. 198. Reproduced as United Nations Trusteeship Council, *Official Records* (TCOR): 20th Sess., Annexes, Agenda item 11.

$5,000,000 in foreign aid, assuming the economy continues to improve at its present rate. According to AFIS estimates, the public-budget deficit will be about $2,200,000; the public-investment program will require an additional $1,500,000; and foreign experts and technicians will cost $1,400,000. Should exportation of bananas fall or stop altogether, these figures will be considerably higher.

AFIS has recently indicated that, if the Somali government so requests, the Italian government "is disposed" to provide Somalia with 250 technicians and experts and to grant 80 to 100 scholarships "during the first years" of independence, at an annual cost to Italy of $1,500,000. The Italian government is also "disposed" to grant $300,000 for aid in balancing the public budget.[29] The United States government has announced it is prepared to continue its financial and technical assistance after 1960, and the United Kingdom has indicated its willingness to contribute. If, as seems probable, independent Somalia decides to participate in the European Common Market, it will receive $5,000,000 over a period of five years from the Market's Development Fund for Overseas Countries and Territories. Although this is a big step toward meeting the economic requirements of an independent Somalia, the magnitude of the economic problems may necessitate additional aid. Since IBRD gives loans only, it practically excluded its own assistance when it stated that for Somalia "aid would have to be in the form of grants."[30]

If Somalia's needs prove to be greater than United States and Italian aid can provide for, it may have to turn to other sources. Egypt has recently indicated that it is prepared to supply some assistance. The role of Communist countries is not clear, but in 1957 commercial agents from Eastern Europe were in Somalia investigating "trade possibilities." Some see in Somalia a ripe field for a struggle between East and West for influence, and this has raised the question of "neutral," that is United Nations, aid, which the Somalis would prefer for psychological and political reasons.

[29] *Corriere della Somalia,* 30 Oct. 1958.
[30] IBRD Report of January 1957, *op. cit.,* para. 210.

From the beginning of the Trusteeship, Somalis have hoped that the United Nations would complement the aid given by AFIS. In the Territorial Council in 1951, this theme, which has often been reiterated since, was underscored:

> We ask that the United Nations include Somalia in its plan for aid to underdeveloped territories. Only in this way can Somalia in the brief period of ten years become politically and economically a free and independent nation.[31]

This was a view of the Trusteeship Council, too; in 1957 it expressed the "hope" that the United Nations and its specialized agencies would give "the most sympathetic consideration" to Somalia's need for financial assistance and material aid.[32] Nevertheless, because the Administering Authority has emphasized the need for financial rather than technical assistance, the United Nations has necessarily played only a limited economic role in Somalia, as compared, for instance, with its activities in Libya. It was not strange that the Visiting Mission in 1957 expressed concern over the disappointment many Somalis felt toward the limited concrete aid the Territory has received from the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

Whatever the source of financial assistance, success in improving the Somali economy depends more on how the aid is used than on the amount. AFIS has had only limited success in technical research and training and in developing marketing procedures, incentive plans, and cooperatives. There are many aspects of animal husbandry and agriculture that could be improved—and without the necessity of large capital expenditure—by the utilization of knowledge and techniques more relevant to Somali conditions than those now available. Plows rust away for lack of use, a fishing scheme is instituted without any comprehensive plan, and the well-drilling program proceeds on the basis of scant hydrological analyses.

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[31] Consiglia Territoriale, *Verbali, op. cit.*, 4 Oct. 1951.

[32] Report of the Trusteeship Council, GAOR: 9th Sess., 1954, Suppl. No. 4, p. 108.

Much more can be done to draw upon the talents and experiences of countries that have had economic problems comparable to those of Somalia. For example, the techniques developed by the Sudanese in agricultural cooperatives and by British colonial officials in the imposition of new taxes, techniques of livestock improvement, and marketing could be called upon to aid Somalia. British experiments with community development programs in dependent territories (AFIS has been particularly weak in this field) have revealed what can be accomplished in getting local participation and cooperation in economic advancement. The recently established United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, at Addis Ababa, might be able to contribute by collecting material on Somali and other nomadic societies. An adequate United Nations scholarship program could assist the Somalis in gaining skills in other African territories where similar problems of economic and social development have been confronted. The Somalis want only to build a house, not a skyscraper.

The economic development of Somalia will depend not only on economic aid but also on political factors. The ideal solution, politically, would be an amicable working relationship between the HDMS and the SYL. Given their past performance on economic legislation and their realistic and practical approaches to the economic problems of Somalia, it seems highly probable that this will be achieved; lingering differences may be dissolved by economic necessity. Political moderation and stability may prove to be the most important elements in the economic development of Somalia; conversely, intelligently planned and efficiently coordinated financial assistance and technical aid may prove to be the most important elements in achieving political moderation and stability.

International Problems

ONE OF THE MOST vexing problems Somalia has faced since 1950—and one that will affect the way Somalia allocates its limited government funds—is the undefined boundary with Ethiopia. The issue came before the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council in 1949, but in the rush to wrap up the Trusteeship Agreement the question was left unresolved. Article I of the Agreement provides only that "boundaries shall be those fixed by international agreement and, in so far as they are not already delimited, shall be delimited in accordance with a procedure approved by the General Assembly." On 15 December 1950, the Assembly adopted Resolution 392 (V), which recommended that Ethiopia and Italy proceed to negotiate directly and that, should they fail to reach agreement, they should proceed to mediation and, finally, to arbitration if the findings of mediation proved unacceptable.

The Boundary Dispute

The problem of the boundary is an inheritance of Italian and Ethiopian expansion over the arid lowlands of the Somali region. In 1908 Italy and Ethiopia signed a Convention providing for definitive delimitation of the frontier,[33] and a few years later an Italo-Ethiopian Commission was appointed to establish the line on the ground. But conflicting opinions on the territorial limits of certain tribes mentioned in the Convention and different interpretations of trigonometric points of reference led to a cessation of the Commission's activities. From about 1920 to 1935, the area administered as Italian

[33] For English text, see *British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-08,* Vol. CI (London, H.M.S.O., 1912), pp. 1000-1001.

Somaliland, which purported to follow the boundary indicated in Italo-Ethiopian agreements, extended in the south from the coast inward to approximately the present frontier. From Fer Fer northward to the border of British Somaliland, at 8° North and 47° East, the line wandered at about 180 miles from the coastline. From 1935 to 1950, when Italy and later Britain occupied the contiguous Somali-inhabited Ogaden province of Ethiopia, it was administered as an integral part of Somalia. The object of both administrations was to ensure effective government over the homogeneous Somali population.

In 1950 the British established a "provisional administrative boundary" at the time of their withdrawal. They placed the northern section of the line farther east than the limits of pre-1935 Italian occupation. The Italian government, as the administering power, declared that it could not consider this provisional line as prejudicing the final solution of the boundary question since it had not been consulted about the demarcation.

After its first visit to the Trust Territory in 1951, the United Nations Visiting Mission reported that

> it would be unfortunate if, in addition to the many serious problems which will unavoidably exist as the trusteeship terminates, the independent State contemplated by the trusteeship arrangement likewise inherits an unresolved boundary question.[34]

During its second trip to Somalia in 1954, the Visiting Mission devoted a substantial part of its itinerary to the boundary area and noted the border incidents and the hardships resulting from the division of Somali tribal groups.[35] The Trusteeship Council showed its growing concern over the issue by instructing the Advisory Council to make a special effort to gain information on the frontier situation.

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[34] TCOR, 11th Sess., 1952, Suppl. No. 4, para. 176.

[35] A large number of Darod tribal wells and water holes are in the Ogaden, while some of the best pasture lands are in Somalia. Since the Darods are often desperate for water when border regulations are enforced, they have in a number of instances raided the water wells of the Hawiye, with bloodshed the result.

In its 1954 report, the Advisory Council gave considerable attention to the vociferous Somali reaction when Britain, in accordance with an 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement, transferred the valuable pasturelands of the Haud and Reserved Area, until then part of British Somaliland, to Ethiopia. Since the eastern portion of the Haud was involved in the border dispute, the Advisory Council believed that the transfer was "in no way prejudicial to whatever decisions or dispositions might be taken on this vital question."[36] Ethiopia protested against "discussion of its internal affairs" by the Council.[37] There the matter rested.

The first definite action taken by the General Assembly on the Somali-Ethiopian border question was in December 1954, when it issued a plea that the two powers arrive at a solution through direct negotiations, and that should they fail to achieve results by July 1955, they should agree on mediation.[38] When "results" were not forthcoming, the Somali representative, Aden Abdullah, strongly urged that the parties proceed to mediation. But a majority in the Assembly felt this would imply a lack of confidence in the parties. It was not until December 1957, when it became apparent that the parties could not reach agreement, that the General Assembly specifically mentioned a timetable, albeit a qualified one, recommending the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal of three jurists, "if possible within three months." It also recommended that the terms of reference be agreed upon by the two parties with assistance by an "independent person."[39] The Assembly thus passed over mediation, on the ground that the period remaining for the Trusteeship was too brief to permit this intermediate step. The arbitral technique is favored by Ethiopia because it contends that the dispute is restricted to different interpretations of the 1908 Convention. The Somalis, who had wanted the more flexible technique of mediation, accepted arbitration after the Somali

[36] TCOR: 16th Sess., Annexes, Agenda item 17.
[37] TCOR: 18th Sess., 708th Mtg., 18 June 1956, para. 99.
[38] General Assembly Res. 854 (IX), 14 Dec. 1954.
[39] General Assembly Res. 1213 (XII), 14 Dec. 1957.

Prime Minister—on the persuasions of several friendly governments—flew to Addis Ababa on a "good neighbor" visit in December 1957. But, as the Advisory Council has stated, there is still an "undercurrent of pessimism among certain elements" in Somalia.[40]

The failure of the two sides to reach a solution over the past nine years has its roots in an emotionally charged background. Ethiopia had vigorously opposed the return of Italy as the Administering Authority in Somalia. Memories of the Fascist conquest were still fresh, and Somalia had been one of the main staging areas for the Italian invasion. Diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia were not resumed until 1952, and when they were, considerable time was spent in the rehashing of old recriminations. Both Italy and Ethiopia proceeded as though the boundary controversy were a purely Italo-Ethiopian affair.[41] Serious negotiations began only in 1955, when the Ethiopian government relinquished its original claim that the boundary established by the Convention of 1908 cut deeply into territory being administered by AFIS and offered to accept the provisional administrative line as a compromise. When Italy rejected the proposal, Ethiopia returned to its original claim. In 1956-57 a modicum of agreement was reached by the two governments on the delimitation of the southern frontier.[42]

It was not until mid-1956 that Somalis began to participate officially in the negotiations. Until then they had felt that their case was not being presented adequately. That they were unhappy about the course of negotiations was indicated by the Somali negotiator, Hagi Farah Ali Omar, in 1957 when he stated:

The principles and treaties on the basis of which the negotiations between Ethiopia and Italy had been conducted were not fully endorsed by the Somali Government, inasmuch as they were in

[40] Advisory Council Report 1957-58, *op. cit.*, para. 43.
[41] The attitude still lingers. See GAOR: 13th Sess., 4th Cmtte., 836th Mtg., 11 Dec. 1958.
[42] For earlier positions of the two governments, see GAOR: 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda item 40, and 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda item 39.

contrast with the rights, aspirations and interests of the Somali people.[43]

By December 1958, the Arbitral Tribunal had been selected, but no agreement had been reached on the *compromis d'arbitrage,* and the independent person had become the elusive "Third Man." In the Italian draft *compromis,* Article III states:

> The Tribunal shall consider the question and give its decision on the basis of all the international conventions relating thereto, and of the interests and well-being of the populations, in harmony with the principles of the United Nations.[44]

In other words, it advocates the application of the principle of *ex aequo et bono.* Italy also insists that the third person be prominent in "public affairs," preferably the Secretary-General of the United Nations or someone appointed by him, rather than an "international jurist." These two aspects of the Italian position reflect the Somali attitude that there can be no equitable and practicable solution of the boundary question if ethnic and other non-legal factors are not given due consideration. The reference in the Italian draft *compromis* to "all the international conventions" accords with the Somali position that the 1908 Convention is only one of the documents that might be considered by the Arbitral Tribunal.

The Ethiopian government insists that the Convention of 1908 must be the *exclusive* basis for arbitration,[45] on the ground that it cannot be bound by those agreements between Italy and other colonial powers to which Ethiopia was not a party. Somalis protest that if this is a valid point, then there is no reason why they should be bound by any agreements at all, since none of them was drafted with Somali consultation. Ethiopia views Italy's *compromis* and its posi-

[43] GAOR: 12th Sess., 4th Cmtte., 734th Mtg., 6 Dec. 1957, para. 39.

[44] United Nations Doc. A/4030, 5 Dec. 1958, p. 3. This memorandum outlines the Italian position.

[45] See United Nations Doc. A/4031, 5 Dec. 1958, and Add. 1, 10 Dec. 1958, for the Ethiopian position. For the most recent General Assembly debates, see GAOR: 13th Sess., 4th Cmtte., 836th, 837th, 839th, 841st, 842nd, and 843rd Mtgs.

tion on a third person as an attempt to mediate rather than arbitrate the question. Article X of the Ethiopian draft, which prevents a third party from being heard, is probably intended to preclude the United Kingdom from submitting evidence.

There is an evident conflict between the Italian and Somali desire to include political and social considerations in the *compromis* and the Ethiopian insistence on restricting the basis to interpretation of one document. Nevertheless, the more responsible leaders in both Ethiopia and Somalia know that it is to the best interests of their respective countries that an amicable relationship exist between them. No matter what the outcome of the boundary dispute, Ethiopia will retain control of the sources of the two rivers on which so much of Somalia's economic life hinges. And an antagonistic Somalia could turn to Egypt for support, a development feared by Ethiopia. The pressures for *rapprochement* become stronger as Somalia's independence day draws nearer, and after the Somali general election campaign is over there may well be a serious effort to reach agreement.

Greater Somalia

The problem of the Ethiopian-Somali boundary is related to the broader question of Somali nationalism in the Horn of Africa and the goal of bringing all Somalis under a single government. Politically conscious Somalis feel that the imposition of five different forms of administration over the Somali people leads not only to injustices but also to continuation of inter-tribal conflicts.[46] It is not merely on the Ethiopian-Somali frontier that serious incidents have occurred. The history of Anglo-Ethiopian relations over the Kenya-Ethiopian boundary and over the British Somaliland-Ethiopian boundary has been marked by acrimony and strife

[46] On the Greater Somalia question, see I. M. Lewis, "Modern Political Movements in Somaliland," *Africa*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (July 1958), pp. 244-261, and No. 4 (Oct. 1958), pp. 244-263; also A. A. Castagno on Somali nationalism, *Africa Special Report*, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Dec. 1958), pp. 9 ff.

essentially because neither side seems to be able to cope with the problems posed by multilateral administration of the Somalis.

The Somalis insist that only through unitary administration will complete economic progress and eventual pacification be possible. No one has put the case more effectively than Ernest Bevin when, in 1946, he sought a British trusteeship over much of the Somali region:

> At about the time we occupied our part [of the Somali coast], the Ethiopians occupied an inland area which is the grazing ground for nearly half the nomads of British Somaliland for six months of the year. Similarly, the nomads of Italian Somaliland must cross the existing frontiers in search of grass. In all innocence, therefore, we proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory.[47]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Italian and British colonial officers with long experience in administering the Somalis. However, at the time of Foreign Minister Bevin's speech, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States opposed the proposal, and Britain dropped the matter.

The major international problem in the Horn of Africa is the eventual conflict between Somali nationalist aspirations and Ethiopian expansionism in defense against these aspirations. Ethiopia fears that the extension of Somali nationalism into the Ogaden might threaten the security and unity of the Empire. This fear is accentuated by the fact that forty per cent of the Ethiopian population is Moslem. In 1956 an Egyptian official was expelled from Ethiopia for unduly interfering in questions concerning the Moslem population. There is also apprehension that Somalia may not prove to be a viable state and that it may fall to powers potentially hostile to Ethiopia. However, the conclusion sometimes

[47] *House of Commons Deb.*, 5th series, Vol. 423 (London, H.M.S.O., 1946), pp. 1840-1841.

drawn[48] from these facts—that there will be conflict between the Coptic Christians of the Ethiopian plateaus and the Moslems of the Somali lowlands—has been called alarmist by Ethiopian officials themselves. In fact, the Ethiopian government has boasted of its ability to accommodate the Moslem population within its territory.

Another facet of this problem is that while Ethiopia is determined to maintain the status quo in the Ogaden, Italy, in Somalia, and the United Kingdom, in British Somaliland, are making concessions to rising Somali demands for self-government. Should British Somaliland and Somalia join in some form of union, an event which is likely to take place some time after 1960,[49] Ethiopia can hardly expect the Somalis in the Ogaden to be content with the status quo.

Ethiopia has often referred to the advantages that could accrue to the Somalis from federation within the Ethiopian Empire. In August 1956, the Ethiopian Emperor made a speech in the Ogaden, inviting Somalis to join with Ethiopia on a basis similar to Eritrea's relationship to the Empire. The major drawback to such a proposal is that there is considerable Somali antipathy toward Ethiopian rule, just as there is toward direct European control. Economically, it is doubtful whether, in the event of federation, Ethiopia would or could make the expenditures necessary to continue or maintain the social and economic advances attained in Somalia. Ethiopia itself is dependent on external financial aid. Politically, provincial rule on the periphery of the Empire has not been notably effective or benevolent. Lastly, Ethiopia, too, is undergoing a period of transition, with the traditional elements obstructing social, economic, and political

[48] See, for example, letter from Margery Perham, in *The Times* (London), 16 Dec. 1957, and reply by K. Abbebe (First Secretary, Ethiopian Embassy, London), 18 Dec. 1957; also, G. R., "The Somalilands," *The British Survey, Main Series, No. 98* (May 1957), and E. Huxley, "Nasser's African Design," *The Sunday Times* (London), 18 May 1958.

[49] On 9 Feb. 1959, Alan Lennox-Boyd, United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced in Hargeisa that, should the Legislative Council of British Somaliland desire "closer association" with independent Somalia, his government "would arrange for negotiations of a suitable nature to take place." Press Release P.10218A, British Information Services, 10 Feb. 1959.

change despite vigorous attempts by the Emperor to modernize.

The United Nations has not been uninformed of the problems in the Horn of Africa. A British Somali delegation in 1955 solicited United Nations aid to recover the Haud and Reserved Area. The Advisory Council has on several occasions pointed to the problems of that region as they relate to Somalia. More recently the Somali National League, the largest political party in British Somaliland, requested the United Nations to hold a plebiscite to determine British Somali sentiment on union with Somalia.

The United Nations has considered itself unable to deal with problems outside the Trust Territory of Somalia. Nevertheless, the Assembly resolution that provided for the independence of Somalia inevitably gave impetus to the natural aspirations of politically conscious Somalis to create a Greater Somalia. Since it accepted the application of the principles of self-government for the Somalis of Somalia, from their point of view the same could hardly be denied to the "French" Somalis, the "British" Somalis, and to the "Ethiopian" Somalis. It would be farfetched to suggest that the United Nations has responsibility for all the consequences of the nationalist developments in the Trust Territories, but where the United Nations has created a state, and where it has been a vital factor in stimulating the nationalist movement, what is precisely the extent of its responsibility and obligations? Whatever the answer, it would seem that the United Nations may have to pursue a more active role in considering the problems of the Horn of Africa than it has in the past.

The Role of the United Nations

A STUDY OF SOMALIA'S development during the Trusteeship period would be incomplete without some attempt to evaluate the role of the United Nations. The activities of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council have differed little from those normally carried on in connection with other Trust Territories except in intensity. The Council undertook a searching analysis on the basis of authoritative information provided by the Visiting Missions and the Administering Authority; the Assembly reviewed developments and prodded the Administering Authority. The new and highly experimental element was the Advisory Council.

On the positive side, it can be said that the physical presence of a United Nations body has helped to provide a direct channel of communication between the Somalis and the United Nations. Up to March 1958, the Secretariat staff attached to the Advisory Council had transmitted, and for the most part translated, some 1,300 petitions and communications, over and above those submitted directly either to the Visiting Missions or to the Trusteeship Council. In addition, the Advisory Council was able to clear up a number of questions brought before it orally by petitioners. The annual reports of the Advisory Council, and the presence of its representatives during discussions on the Territory in the Trusteeship Council provided an insight into developments in Somalia supplementing the information provided by AFIS and the Visiting Missions.

Through speeches, field trips, dissemination of United Nations literature, and personal appearances, the Advisory Council members and staff have given the Somali people, especially in the urban areas, an exceptional awareness of the

United Nations and of its interest in Somalia. During the first years of the Trusteeship period, several members, and in particular one Egyptian, were exceptionally helpful in attempting to modify political extremism and reduce the severe tension between some tribes.

Although there were complaints, particularly during the early years, that AFIS did not consult the Advisory Council concerning specific draft laws and that matters transmitted merely as information should have been sent as requests for advice, cooperation between the two bodies appears to have been relatively satisfactory.[50] In most instances, the advice given by the Council has been accepted, but the usefulness of the Council has depended chiefly on the personalities, interests, and capabilities of the individual representatives and staff, and as the membership of the Council has varied, so has its usefulness.

Here, perhaps, lies the crux of the matter. The Council was composed of government representatives with an inevitably divided loyalty—to their countries and to the United Nations. There was a tendency on the part of individual members to take sides for or against the Administering Authority, for or against the Somalis, for or against other national influences within the area, on the basis of their own government's policy; even if this had not been the case, national motivations would undoubtedly have been read into the actions of the members.

One Philippine member of the Council was allegedly instrumental in intensifying discord between AFIS and the SYL. And a recent book printed in Egypt, *Plot in Africa,*[51] has suggested that another member, Mohammed Kamal Eddine Saleh, had exercised his office as delegate to the Advisory Council to achieve the policy aims of his government by

[50] For a review of the work of the United Nations Advisory Council and the Italian Administration in the period 1950-55, see Lawrence S. Finkelstein, *Somaliland under Italian Administration* (New York, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1955). Also, R. Meregazzi, *L'Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana sulla Somalia* (Milan, 1954).

[51] Ahmad Baha' al-Din, *Mu'amaraton fi Ifriqia* (Cairo, Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1958). Mr. Seleh was assassinated in April 1957 by a Somali.

opposing the establishment of Protestant missions in Somalia and attempting to prevent the representation of ICA and the Sinclair Somal Oil Corporation on the Somali Economic Development Agency, which AFIS had set up. It has also been suggested that the insistence of the Egyptian member of the Council on the adoption of Arabic as the instructional language was related to Egypt's desire to foster Somali-Egyptian solidarity. Whatever the truth of, or justification for, such activities, the fact remains that the Council was deprived of the reputation of neutrality and disinterestedness it should have had. Given the background of rivalry between the West, Egypt, and Ethiopia for dominant influence in Somalia, it is doubtful whether the Advisory Council could have completely avoided identification with political forces, but the result has been that the staff has been inhibited in providing the type of political analysis that might have been most useful.

Another problem has been that few governmental representatives were anxious to be stationed in an area that offered relatively few amenities and which was outside the mainstream of diplomatic life. The result has been frequent changes of staff and a high degree of absenteeism. In fact, during the later years the Colombian member has been absent much of the time. As a result, when disagreements arose between the two remaining members concerning communications to AFIS, protracted delays have occurred.

These facts raise several questions as to the composition of the Council. Would it have been feasible or desirable to have appointed not countries but members in their individual capacity? Or did the fact that Advisory Council members were representatives of governments facilitate relations with AFIS? If the members were to be countries, could a selection have been made in terms of the individual country's ability and willingness to assure continuous representation? Would a larger body have mitigated or aggravated the problems of absenteeism and of political involvement?

Other problems hampered the Council. In the first few years of the Trusteeship period, Somalis gained the impression that the Advisory Council had supervisory powers. This

exaggerated interpretation of its powers generated doubts and confusion as to the proper lines of authority and led, in some instances, to efforts by political and tribal leaders to pit the Advisory Council against AFIS, thus complicating problems of cooperation between the latter and the Somalis.

Actually, the Trusteeship Agreement put AFIS in a difficult position. It was required to seek the aid and advice of the Advisory Council, but not to implement the advice it received. If AFIS accepted the Council's advice, then Italy had to provide any necessary financing that could not be found from the already meager Somali resources. The Council, too, was in a difficult position, for it had no special funds to dispense, nor did it have the reflected power and prestige that might have accrued from association with a substantial technical assistance program.

Furthermore, the small staff attached to the Council was hampered to some extent by lack of funds and personnel.[52] AFIS tended to submit many of its requests for advice in the period immediately before AFIS and Advisory Council annual reports had to be prepared. Backlogs developed as a result, and the staff was often unable to treat requests for advice with the thoroughness required. The speed of processing communications to the Trusteeship Council and of giving observations on information tendered by AFIS has also been adversely affected by limitations in staff.

When legislative authority over domestic issues devolved on the Somali government and the Legislative Assembly in 1956, the question arose as to what role the Advisory Council should play, since, by its terms of reference, it was empowered only to advise AFIS. An agreement was reached in September 1957 between the Advisory Council and AFIS, with the blessing of the Trusteeship Council, permitting the Council to give its advice to the Somali cabinet or to individual ministers if such advice were solicited.[53] Like Italy, however, the Somali government has been reluctant to avail

[52] In 1953 its budget was $167,400 and its staff numbered fifteen.

[53] For the full terms of the agreement see United Nations Doc. T/1372, *op. cit.*, para. 23-30.

itself of the services of the Council, fearing a derogation of its independence of judgment and political action. Although several major issues, particularly with respect to such questions as the drafting of legislation, have been referred to the Council, experience suggests that its views are accepted only if they do not conflict with the political aims of the government. The government has failed to inform the Council of some major political developments in the Territory, and in general has had increasingly less recourse to the Council's official and unofficial facilities since 1957, when it became clear that independence was assured.

In the light of the problems that have arisen in connection with the Advisory Council, the question might be considered whether the functions of the Council could have been carried out more satisfactorily by a combination of the Visiting Missions and a senior Secretariat official from the United Nations with a small staff stationed in Mogadiscio. Although the Visiting Missions spent relatively short periods of time in the Territory, their reports were especially perceptive. The Secretariat staff also made a valuable contribution, but it did not, and was not established to, provide leadership or direction to the United Nations program in Somalia.

Whatever the shortcomings of the United Nations machinery, Somalia will be in a better position to face the future in 1960 than anyone had anticipated ten years ago. For this, a substantial measure of credit is due to the Somalis themselves and to Italy as the Administering Authority. To some extent, the motivating force behind Italy's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Trusteeship Agreement stems from its foreign policy objectives—gaining admission to the United Nations, erasing the memory of Fascist excesses, and obtaining an outlet for its surplus skills and products in Africa and the Middle East. The United Nations has also made a major contribution in prodding the Administering Authority into taking speedy action in somalizing and democratizing political institutions and in accelerating the rhythm of educational growth and economic development. To Somalis, who may not have distinguished between pre-war Italian colonial ad-

ministrators and post-war Italian trusteeship administrators (in many cases they were the same people), the United Nations presence was the guarantee that independence was really on the way.[54]

[54] The most up-to-date and comprehensive bibliographical work on Somalia is Camera di Commercio, Industria ed Agricultura della Somalia, *Bibliografia Somala* (Mogadiscio, Tip. Missione, 1958).

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